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LAW JOURNAL
Volume XV AUGUST, 1940 Number 6
"DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF
SECURITIES UNDER THE
REVENUE ACTS"*
By CHARLES C. PARLIN
"Securities can take many forms, and it is hazardous to try to find
molds into which all arrangements can certainly be poured."
This is the analysis by Judge Learned Hand in Jewel Tea
Company, Inc. v. U. 8.1 Yet the Revenue Acts force the
lawyer to classify instruments issued by corporations and
important tax results depend on the classification. Generally
speaking, instruments issued by corporations must be classified
for tax purposes as (a) "stock", (b) "securities" or (c)
"other property".
"STOCK"
The following opinion might some day be called for:
"Dear Sirs:
You have requested our opinion as to whether (a) the interest on
the Company's Debentures and (b) the dividends paid upon its 6%
Cumulative Preferred Stock, or either, may be deducted in computing
taxable net income.
*Of the New York City Bar; member of firm of Wright, Gordon, Zachry
& Parlin.
190 F. (2d) 451 (1937).
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It has been stated that 'A certificate of indebtedness is * * * quite a
different thing from a certificate of capital stock in a corporation'
(Armstrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 248 Fed. 268, C.C.A.
9th, 1918), and of course interest paid upon the former, only, may
be deducted in computing a corporation's income subject to income
tax.
In view of the provisions of the Company's issues of debentures
and preferred stock and in view of the facts surrounding the issue
thereof, as disclosed in the papers submitted to us, it is our opinion
(a) that the debentures are in fact preferred stock (In re Fechheimer
Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357, C.C.A. 2nd, 1914, cert. denied 234 U.S.
760), and (b) that the preferred stock in fact represents a debt (Jones
Syndicate v. Commissioner, 23 F. (2d) 833, C.C.A. 7th, 1927; Palmer,
Stacy-Merrill, Inc. v. Commissioner 37 B.T.A. 530, modified opinion
39 B.T.A. 636).
Therefore, the interest paid upon the debentures, being in fact divi-
dends, is not deductible, but the dividends on the preferred stock, being
in fact payments of interest, are deductible, in computing the net
income of the corporation.
Very truly yours,"
As this unlikely, but nevertheless possible opinion indicates,
whether an instrument represents stock or indebtedness is not
always as clear as the court in the A4rmstrong case seemed to
think.
There is no comprehensive rule which can be relied upon
to decide this question, but the following characteristics and
circumstances tend to distinguish a certificate of indebtedness
and to differentiate it from a share of stock: (1) designation
as a bond, debenture, note, or other generally accepted term
for an indebtedness; (2) intention of the parties that the
instrument represent a debt rather than a stock interest;
(3) fixed rate of interest; (4) absence of voting powers;
(5) parity with general creditors as to interest and principal;
(6) provision for payment irrespective of net profits; and
(7) maturity date.
It is clear that any instrument containing all of the above
provisions constitutes an indebtedness with respect to which
payments of interest are deductible for income tax purposes.
2
It is also clear, however, that an instrument may constitute an
2 Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, 2,4 U. S. 552.
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indebtedness although it does not contain all of the above
provisions.
At the present time the corporate income tax is effected
by the classification as interest or dividend. If Congress
adopts a "war excess profits tax" in any one of the various
forms from time to time discussed in the press, the problem
will become even more acute in the computation of the
"invested capital" and in the computation of "pre-war earn-
ings". In any classification the following factors, at least,
must be considered:
DESIGNATION
Designation of a corporate instrument, while perhaps not
immaterial, is certainly not conclusive. In the Jewel Tea Co.
case, supra, the taxpayer was attempting to get the benefit of
a deduction for premiums paid on the redemption of its
preferred shares, the argument being that because of certain
charter provisions the shares were the equivalent of debt. The
court denied the deduction but in discussing the problem said:
"the test cannot be merely the name given to the security."
and again the same court in denying a deduction for "interest"
paid on "debentures" said :3
"The name is not conclusive of the nature of the securities."
In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., supra, is a bankruptcy case but
the principle is clearly stated. The question at issue was the
validity of a promissory note issued by the corporation in
exchange for one of its outstanding "debenture bonds". The
argument was made that these "debenture bonds" were in fact
preferred stock and that the note was invalid because it had
been given in retirement of stock. The court sustained the
contention stating:
"It is necessary in the first place to determine the real nature of the
so-called 'debenture bonds' which this corporation issued. The courts
3 Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, Inc., (C. C. A. 2nd), F. (2d),
March 18, 1940.
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have determined that the fact that an instrument is called a 'bond' is
not conclusive as to its character. It is necessary to disregard nomen-
clature and look to the substance of the thing itself."
The Board of Tax Appeals in Proctor Shop, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner4 had before it instruments called "debenture preference
stock". The Board held that amounts paid on these instru-
ments constituted interest and could be deducted as such in
computing net income, stating:
"In each case it must be determined whether the real transaction
was that of an investment in the corporation or a loan to it. On this
the designation of the instrument issued by the corporation, while not
to be ignored, is not conclusive."
INTENTION
Not only have the courts been willing to disregard the name
of a corporate instrument and the terminology of the corporate
records, but they have been surprisingly liberal in allowing
oral testimony on the intention of the parties even though the
same is in direct conflict with the written records. In the
Jones Syndicate case 5 the group borrowed money to redeem
real estate from foreclosure. The testimony showed that a
lender was willing to put up the money at an interest rate of
14% but in order to circumvent the usury laws of Illinois the
lawyers worked out for him a "first preferred stock". Under
the terms these shares were subordinated to all debts and
obligations of the syndicate; voting control passed to the
holders of the shares if the same were not redeemed on or
before a specified date. The Board allowed this and other
oral evidence regarding the reasons and purposes and the
intentions of the parties and found that the substance of the
transaction was the creation of a debt and therefore allowed
as an interest deduction the amount paid. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, saying:
"We therefore conclude that a taxpayer who borrows money at a
usurious rate of interest and who, to conceal the usury, is compelled
to execute a document which does not correctly describe the relation-
4 30 B. T. A. 721, affd. 82 F. (2d) 792.
5 Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th), 23 R , (2d) 833.
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ship of the parties, may, as against the government, disclose the true
relationship of debtor and creditor. Sums by it paid as interest, regard-
less of the name by which it is called, may be deducted by the taxpayer
from its income."
The Board of Tax Appeals again had before it payments
on shares of "preferred stock ' 6 on which the quarterly pay-
ments had been guaranteed and the company had also guaran-
teed that the shares would be redeemed at par in fixed numbers
at specified dates. Again the Board allowed the taxpayer to
introduce evidence showing the history of the transaction and
the reason for the issue of the stock and the provisions
regarding it and the Board was persuaded that the "dividend"
payments were in fact interest and therefore deductible. The
Board said:
"We regard the evidence of intent of the parties too clear to be over-
come by formal recitations in the stock certificates."
In the Bush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. case7 the taxpayer
exchanged shares of its own "second preferred stock" for
notes which it had outstanding and "guaranteed" the dividend
payments. The Board again allowed the taxpayer to explain
all of the surrounding circumstances and held that the "divi-
dends" constituted interest because the parties intended to
retain the creditor relationship in spite of the exchange of the
notes for stock.8
Certainly the Board has been surprisingly lenient with the
rules of evidence in allowing the parties full opportunity to
present an oral version contrary to the written records. Yet
it is not always persuaded. In the Angelus Building & Invest-
ment Co. case9 and in the Elko Larnoille Power Co. case",
6 Palmer, Stacy-Merrill Inc., 39 B. T. A. 636-previous hearing 37 B. T. A.
530.
7 Bush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 787.
8 See also Overland Knight Co., Inc., 15 B. T. A. 870; National Cotton Seed
Products Corp. v. Comm., 76 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 6th); Paramount Knitting
Mills, 17 B. T. A. 91; Cf. Wiggins Terminals Inc. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1) 36 F.
(2d) 893.
9 20 B. T. A. 667, affirmed (C. C. A. 9th) 57 F. (2d) 130, cert. denied 286
U. S. 562.
10 21 B. T. A. 291, affirmed (C. C. A. 9th) 50 F. (2d) 595.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the Board listened to but ignored oral evidence attempting to
prove that preferred stock had in fact been intended as a debt.
The New York courts have been less lenient with evidence
on intent.
In People ex rel Cohn & Co. v. Miller, 180 N. Y. 16, the
Court of Appeals of New York held that preferred debenture
shares presented a "legal contradiction". The taxpayer, in
the face of the declaration in the articles of association that
the money represented by such certificates constituted a part
of the capital stock of the corporation, was held to be estopped
from asserting the contrary in a proceeding to determine their
liability to the franchise tax. An element of estoppel was also
suggested in the Kentucky River Coal case (infra), where the
court noted that the debenture stock upon which an interest
deduction was claimed had been treated as invested capital
under the war excess profits tax.
RATE AND DATE OF PAYMENT
It is common for both preferred stock and instruments of
indebtedness to provide for payment of dividends or interest
at a fixed rate and at specified periodic intervals. While the
cases often mention these factors they appear of little conse-
quence in the ultimate determination of the nature of a par-
ticular instrument.
VOTING POWERS
Certificates of indebtedness ordinarily confer on the holder
no voting power. But it is also common for preferred stock
to confer no voting power upon the holder, except perhaps in
the event of defaults or in the event of non-payment of
dividends for a specified period. Many of the cases dealing
with this subject mention the presence or absence of voting
provisions in arriving at their ultimate conclusion but this
factor has never been held vital. In the case of In re
Culbertson's,11 it was argued that the absence of a vote
demonstrated that the instrument in question was debt and not
11 (C. C. A. 9th) 54 F. (2d) 753.
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stock. The court apparently felt called upon to answer this
argument and expressly stated that the absence of vote did not
deprive the instrument of its character as preferred stock,
making reference to the state law which specifically authorized
the issuance of preferred stock with no voting power. A
similar argument, made in the Schnoll case, supra, was tersely
answered by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit with the statement:
"While the debenture holders have no vote at meetings of the company,
preferred stockholders sometimes have no such right."
This matter seems elementary and yet it is often discussed in
the cases.
1 2
RELATIONSHIP TO GENERAL CREDITORS
The relationship to general creditors while not a deter-
minative factor constitutes an important element in differenti-
ation between debt and stock. The cases have gone both ways
on this point. For example, in Estate Planning Corporation
v. Commissioner,'13 the court had before it debentures which
had been issued for the good will of a partnership and had
been made specifically subordinate to the rights of creditors
and yet these debentures were held to constitute debt.1 4 On
the other hand, in the Fechheinter Fishel case, supra, the court
quoted the provisions subordinating the debentures to the
claims of business creditors and apparently gave considerable
weight to these provisions in holding debenture bonds to be
preferred stock. In the Schmoll case (supra), the court says:
"The debentures closely resemble cumulative preferred stock * * *
in being subordinate to bank creditors in the payment of principal even
12 See Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 3 B. T. A. 644; Schmoll
Fils ssociated, Inc., 39 B. T. A. 411 (reversed C. C. A. 2nd); Commissioner
v. National Grange Mutual Liability Co. (C. C. A. 1st) 80 F. (2d) 316.
13101 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1939).
14 An instrument may be debt even though subordinated to claims of ordinary
creditors. The Proctor Shop, Incorporated v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 721
(1934); Commissioner v. 0. P. P. Holding Corporation, 76 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1935) (affirming 30 B. T. A. 337, 1934); I. Uterburg & Co., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 2 B. T. A. 274 (1925) ; H. R. De Milt Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A.
7 (1927).
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where there is a liquidation of the company. In short the debenture
holders do not possess the ordinary right of creditors to obtain uncon-
ditional payment of their claims at some time. The position of the
debenture holders is that of investors rather than creditors."
Provisions placing preferred stockholders for all practical
purposes on a par with general creditors by express prohibition
against creation of liens on the property of the corporation or
incurring of indebtedness in excess of stated amounts have
uniformly been held not to be sufficient to transform a stock
interest into a debt. In the Kentucky River Coal case (supra),
the majority opinion made no reference to the limitation on
indebtedness in excess of $25,000 so long as the preferred
stock was outstanding. The dissenting opinion argued that this
limitation, when coupled with the preference over the common
stock, accomplished practically the same result as a lien or a
mortgage upon the property of the corporation. In the
William Cluff Co. case 15 a preferred stock provision prohibited
the corporation from placing a lien upon its property or
creating any unsecured indebtedness maturing later than one
year from the date of issue. The Board found that, with this
provision, the preferred stockholders were "almost certain to
have their stock redeemed" and yet it held that a debt was not
created. In the McCoy-Garten Realty Co. case 16 the corpora-
tion agreed not to encumber its property or incur indebtedness
over $2,000. The Board stated that this provision was
"more easily interpreted as protection to preferred stockholders than,
as suggested by the petitioner, as showing that the preferred stock-
holders were, in fact, creditors." (p. 858)
PAYMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF NET PROFITS
In the Fechheimer Fishel Co. case (supra), the Board in
holding that debenture bonds were in reality preferred stock
relied upon the facts that interest was payable only out of
earnings, and that upon final distribution of the corporation's
assets the so-called debenture bonds were entitled to the whole
15 7 B. T. A. 662 (1927).
16 14 B. T. A. 853 (1928).
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residue of the company's assets after payment of its debts.
The Board said:
"These features are quite characteristic of stock. They are not at all
characteristic of bonds."
In Commissioner v. 0. P. P. Holding Corporation, supra,
the debenture bonds were subordinated to the claims of all
other creditors and the company could at its option suspend
or defer the payment of interest. The court said that these
provisions were not fatal in view of the fact that ultimately
the debenture holder was to be paid a definite sum at a fixed
time, irrespective of the existence of net profits.
In the H. R. De Milt Co. case 17 the Board of Tax Appeals
held, however, that where a corporation issued its 20-year
debentures and common stock for the assets of a partnership,
the debentures represented evidences of indebtedness rather
than invested capital for the purposes of the war excess profits
tax despite the fact that the interest upon the so-called deben-
tures was payable only out of surplus or net profits. The
Board said:
"Nor do we think the fact that the interest was to be paid out of 'surplus
or net profits' would be controlling."
It is evident from the decisions and the dissents that the
members of the Board are not in accord, among themselves,
as to the weight to be accorded this factor. In The Tennessee
Company'8 the Board held, Mellott and Kern dissenting, that
interest-bearing income notes payable as to principal and
interest only out of net earnings constituted indebtedness
rather than shares of preferred stock under the personal
holding company provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934, and
that amounts paid in retirement thereof were deductible in
computing the undistributed adjusted net income of the cor-
poration. The majority said:
"The fact that both principal and interest of the notes were payable
primarily out of net earnings and that the notes had no fixed due date
177 B. T. A. 7.
18 40 B. T. A. 154; aff'd. C. C. A. 3rd, March 29, 1940.
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does not, in the light of their other attributes, destroy the character ot
the 'promissory notes' as evidences of indebtedness."
In the most recent case on this question, however, the
Board was compelled to swing the other way because of the
local law. In the Dayton & Michigan Railroad Co. case 2° the
petitioner issued preferred stock having guaranteed dividends
but no voting rights. A mortgage on the petitioner's property
secured the payment of the dividends and it was provided that
the properties of the company should not thereafter be
encumbered to the prejudice of the preferred stockholders.
In case of default the trustee under the mortgage was entitled
to take over management of the railroad. The Supreme Court
of Ohio had held that the shares were not debt for purpose
of local tax despite the mortgage and its provisions because
dividends were payable only out of earnings and the rights of
the preferred stockholders were in other respects subordinate
to those of creditors. Although the Board stated that it was
not bound by the Ohio Court, it nevertheless followed the
conclusion, emphasizing, as a reason for its decision, the fact
that dividends were payable only out of earnings.
The difference of opinion among the members of the Board
is further demonstrated in the majority and minority opinions
in the Schmoll case (supra) .21
OBLIGATION TO PAY PRINCIPAL ON DEFINITE MATURITY
DATE
A line of authorities make it clear that the existence of a
positive obligation to pay on a definite maturity date, or the
right of the holder of an instrument at his option to demand
payment, is not in itself enough to make the instrument a debt.
19 Cf. Haffenreffer Brewing Company, 41 B. T. A., February 20, 1940.
20 40 B. T. A. 856.
21 The Treasury Department is also uncertain of its position in this matter.
in G. C. M. 10384 it was ruled that interest accrued on the "Income Debentures"
of New York Railways Co. was deductible. While revocation of this ruling has
not been published an assessment has been made and the general Counsel has
stated his intention to litigate the point.
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Thus, in Perrine & Buckelew, Inc. v. Commissioner,22 certain
assets had been set aside to liquidate the "A stock" of the
corporation and 6% per year was payable upon their value.
Despite the fact that the shareholder had the right to have
his stock redeemed upon notice to the corporation, it was held
that the security was stock and not a debt. In the Kentucky
River Coal case, supra, the preferred stock in question pro-
vided for retirement in 10 years from the date of its issue and
yet the court held that this was not sufficient to change its
status from that of stock to indebtedness. 23
On the other hand, in Bolinger-Franklin Lumber Co. v.
Commissioner,24 it was held that certain Class A preferred
stock was in fact an indebtedness, apparently because of the
provisions for its retirement. The stock had been issued for
certain timber land and by its terms was redeemable out of the
gross receipts from the sale of the timber by the corporation,
the corporation guaranteeing, subject to certain contingencies
beyond its control, to market a specified amount of the timber
each year.25
But can an instrument constitute a debt if there is no
ultimate due date for the principal?
The First Circuit has held in the affirmative, allowing
deduction of interest paid to the holders of "guaranty units"
without maturity date issued by a mutual insurance company. 28
The Fourth Circuit also will allow a deduction for interest
payments made on instruments lacking maturity date.2 7 The
Board has consistently held that a due date for the principal
was not an essential to the establishment of a debt relationship.
22 32 B. T. A. 168.
23 Similar provisions were involved and similar results reached in Leasehold
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B. T. A. 1129 (1926); William Cluff Co. v.
Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 662 (1927); Doan Savings & Loan Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 12 B. T. A. 772 (1928); McCoy-Garten Realty Co. v. Commissioner,
14 B. T. A. 853 (1928); Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A.
291 (1930) ; Finance & Investment Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 64-3
(1930) ; In re Culbertson's, 54 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
24 7 B. T. A. 402.
25 See, also, Guaranty State Savings & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A.
72 (1928).
26 National Grange Mutual Liability Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 316.
27 Helvering v. Richmond F. & R. R. Co., 90 F. (2d) 971.
INDIANA LA WF JOURNAL
In the Second Circuit, however, it is doubtful whether a
taxpayer can secure a deduction for interest paid unless the
instrument contains a definite maturity date for the principal,
in spite of the fact that the court has recently taken care to
state that the precise issue was not passed upon. In Commis-
sioner v. 0. P. P. Holding Corp.2s the court held that 25-year
debenture bonds issued by the taxpayer constituted indebt-
edness and in reaching its conclusion laid stress upon the
maturity date as proof of the debt relationship, saying:
"The final criterion between creditor and shareholder we believe to be
the contingency of payment."
In Jewel Tea Co., Inc. v. U. S., supra, the court, in holding
that preferred shares did not constitute indebtedness, stated:
"Possibly Commissioner v. 0. P. P. Holding Corporation, supra, 76
F (2d) 11, does not commit us to the doctrine that shares must under
all crcumstances be debts when they contain a provision that the holder
may unconditionally demand his money at a fixed time. * * * All
we now decide is that in the absence of such a provision the security
cannot be a debt."
But in reversing the Board in the Schmoll case, supra,
and holding that debentures without maturity date did not
constitute debt the court, after reviewing the cases, said:
"It is not necessary to hold that the absence of a maturity date if taken
alone would necessarily prevent a document from representing an
'indebtedness' as that word is used in Section 23 (b) of the Revenue
Acts of 1932 and 1934 or would invariably preclude the return from
investments evidenced by the debentures from being treated as 'interest'.
But here the absence of a maturity date, the obligation to pay income
from net earnings and the subordination of the debentures to the rights
of bank creditors renders the payments more like dividends than interest
and the securities like preferred stock rather than bonds."
It also seems doubtful whether the Fifth Circuit will allow
a deduction for interest unless the instrument has a maturity
date. In U. S. v. South Georgia Railway Co.29 the court
in reversing the lower court said:
2876 F. (2d) 11.
29 107 Fed. (2d) S.
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"There is, thus, an entire absence here of the most significant, if not the
essential feature of a debtor and creditor as opposed to a stockholder
relationship, the existence of a fixed maturity for the principal sum with
the right to force payment of the sum as a debt in the event of
default."a0
CONCLUSION
In summary on the issue of stock or debt, no exact defini-
tion is possible under the present cases. Corporations have
experimented, and no doubt will continue to experiment, in
devising instruments which will give the tax advantage of
deductions for interest paid and yet retain for the corpora-
tion the advantages of preferred stock, namely discretionary
current payment for the use of the funds invested in the
enterprise and freedom from obligation to return the funds
so invested. The cases involve factual matters to such a
large degree that the courts have had, and will continue to
have, difficulty in framing questions of law which can be
put at rest by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile when a cor-
poration wishes to issue instruments departing from the usual
form of debt the lawyer will have to test them in the light
of the various factors discussed herein and weigh the risks
of losing the benefit of the deduction for interest paid against
the corporate advantages sought to be obtained.
"SECURITIES" V. "OTHER PROPERTY"
In many instances under the Internal Revenue Code the
identification of a corporate obligation as a security or not a
security must be made. For example:
I. Section 112(b) (3) provides that no gain or loss shall
be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation, a party
to a reorganization, are, in pursuance of the plan of reor-
ganization, exchanged for stock or securities in such corpora-
tion or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
The problem here may arise in identifying either the old
obligations turned in by the taxpayer or the new obligations
being issued to him in exchange.
30 Cf. Thomas v. Perkins, et al, 108 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 5th).
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II. Section 112(b) (4) provides that no gain or loss
shall be recognized if a corporation, a party to a reorganiza-
tion, exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorgani-
zation, for stock or securities in another corporation a party
to the reorganization.
III. Section 112(b) (5) provides that no gain or loss
shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpora-
tion by one or more persons in exchange for stock or securities
and immediately after the exchange such persons are in con-
trol of the corporation.
IV. Section 113 (a) (5) singles out stock or' securities of
a foreign personal holding company from the general rule
of cost basis for property transmitted by death and Provides
that the cost basis for such stock and securities shall be the
fair market value at the time of acquisition or the basis in
the hands of the decedent, whichever is lower.
V. Section 113(a) (6) provides the basis for allocating
a substituted cost basis between the properties (other than
money) received upon a tax-free or partially tax-free ex-
change. If the obligations received are not securities but
"other property" an amount of cost base is assigned to them
equivalent in amount to their fair market value at the date
of the exchange; if the obligations are securities the original
cost base will be allocated between the stock and securities
received on the basis of their relative fair market values at
the date of the exchange. This may, of course, be important.
In the Lloyd-Smith case, for example, the question at issue
was the cost basis on the sale of a $70,000 note which had
been acquired by the taxpayer on the organization of a cor-
poration, tax-free under Section 112(b) (5). If the note
was not a security the cost basis was its fair market value at
the time of receipt which was par, or $70,000; if it was a
security a part of the cost basis of the properties transferred
to the new corporation would be allocated to it and this
allocation gave the note a cost of $438,032.70.
VI. Section 118 denies the benefit of a loss resulting from
a wash sale of stock or securities and its counterpart, Section
113 (a) (10) defines the cost basis for the stock or securities
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which are acquired pursuant to such a transaction. These
sections would not apply to corporate obligations which fell
outside the definition of "securities."
VII. Section 332 defines personal holding company in-
come as including (subsection b) gains from the sale or ex-
change of stock or securities. Apparently, gains from cor-
porate obligations not meeting the definition would constitute
non-personal holding company income in establishing the tax
status of a foreign corporation.
VIII. Section 333(b) provides that in ascertaining
whether a corporation is to be classed as a foreign personal
holding company so far as stock ownership is concerned all
securities convertible into stock shall be considered as out-
standing stock. Apparently the rule does not apply to cor-
porate obligations which are not within the scope of the
definition.
The United States Supreme Court on January 2, 1940,
held the transfer of all the properties of a Texas irrigation
company not a "reorganization" under the Revenue Act.3'
The Government made the argument, among others, that
the bonds, which had been issued in exchange and which
matured serially over a period of 13Y2 months to approxi-
mately 12 years, did not constitute "securities." The Court
brushed aside differentiations based on length of term and
Mr. Justice Roberts said:
"In applying our decision in the Pinellas case the courts have generally
held that receipt of long term bonds as distinguished from short term
notes constitutes the retention of an interest in the purchasing corpora-
tion. There has naturally been some difficulty in classifying the
securities involved in the various cases.
We are of opinion that the term of the obligations is immaterial."
The Board of Tax Appeals is obviously confused on the
issue. On February 14, 1940, in labama Limestone Co. v.
Coi mmissioner,3 2 a bondholders committee had taken over all
the properties of an insolvent corporation at bankruptcy sale
31 Le Tulle v. Scofield, 60 Sup. Ct. 313.
3241 B. T. A.
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and organized a new company. The question was the cost
basis of the properties and the Board, trying to apply the
LeTulle case, held there was a reorganization and that the
old basis carried over. VanFossan and Leech dissented with-
out disclosing their reasons. Murdock wrote a dissent in
which he analyzed the LeTulle, case and came to the conclu-
sion that there was not a reorganization and Sternhagen and
Opper agreed with this dissent. Disney dissented on still
another analysis. Mellott announced his dissent on the basis
of the views expressed by both Murdock and Disney.
In retrospect it can now be seen that Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Cammissioner,33 was the source of this and
at least two other lines of decisions, none of which have yet
come to rest. The Pinellas case was fairly simple. The
Company transferred all of its assets for $400,000 in cash
and $1,000,000 in four months' notes. Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds in holding that there had been no "reorganization"
under these facts said, in the first place:
"The mere purchase for money of the assets of one company by
another is beyond the evident purpose of the provision."
This is the doctrine which, carried to its extreme conclusion,
flowered in the Gregory case.3 4 Certainly the Board of Tax
Appeals and the courts have not to date found a satisfactory
limit for the extension of this doctrine of "purpose" and a
practitioner is always harassed with the problem that his
transaction to be a "reorganization" within the definition of
the statute must not only meet the terms of the statute but
must meet a "purpose" intended by Congress.
Again, when Mr. Justice McReynolds said:
"We think that to be within the exception the seller must acquire an
interest in the affairs of the purchasing company more definite than
that incident to ownership of its short term purchase money notes."
he picked up a thought which had been previously expressed
by Judge Augustus Hand in Cortland Specialty Co. v. Com-
33 287 U. S. 462 (1933).
34 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465.
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missioner,2 enlarged it, and started that turbulent stream of
cases dealing with "continuity of interest."
And again, when Mr. Justice McReynolds said:
"These notes-mere evidence of obligation to pay the purchase-price
-were not securities within the intendment of the Act and were
properly regarded as the equivalent of cash. It would require clear
language to lead us to conclude that Congress intended to grant exemp-
tion to one who sells property and for the purchase price receives well
secured short term notes (all payable within four months) when another
who makes a like sale and receives cash certainly would be taxed. We
can discover no good basis in reason for the contrary view and its
acceptance would make evasion of taxation very easy. In substance the
petitioner sold for the equivalent of cash."
he started the courts and the Board of Tax Appeals off on
a game of "blind man's buff" to find the definition of a
security.
Apparently this last specific question-the definition of se-
curities for purpose of the reorganization sections-attracted
the attention of the Supreme Court only once in the period
intervening between the Pinellas case and the LeTulle case.
This was in Helvering v. Watts35 where a corporation had
disposed of all its assets in exchange for stock and what the
Court described as "$1,161,184.50 of mortgage bonds." The
record indicates that these in fact were bonds secured by a
mortgage and were guaranteed by an affiliated company.
$161,184.50 matured in two months and $1,000,000 matured
serially over a period of seven years. Without discussing
or disclosing in the opinion the nature of the instruments,
Mr. Justice McReynolds merely stated:
"The bonds we think were securities within the definition and cannot
be regarded as cash as were the short term notes referred to in Pinellas
Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner."
With only the Pinellas and Watts cases as guides the courts
have failed to find any precise definition but were tending
35 296 U. S. 387.
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toward a proposition that the test was the term. A long
term obligation was a "security"; a short term was not.
Each court began to look for the length of term necessary.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the
Averill case36 thought that a $2,500,000 ten year bond issue
maturing serially constituted "securities" under the Watts
case (but rejected the Commissioner's claim that there was
a reorganization on other grounds). The Second Circuit
in the Tyng case 37 held that an $11,000,000 issue of 20-year
convertible debentures of the Associated Gas & Electric Com-
pany were "securities" merely because of their long term,
specifically rejecting the argument of the Commissioner that
only secured obligations could be "securities." In the Stirn
case 38 it held that $463,000 of debenture bonds maturing
$100,000 in one year and the balance over another four
years, but all in fact paid off within one year, were not "securi-
ties." As the reason Judge Augustus Hand stated:
"In the case at bar the bonds not only had an average maturity of
only two and a half years but were all paid off within ten months."
The Third Circuit in the Freund case39 held $600,000 of six
year first mortgage bonds to be "securities." The Seventh
Circuit in the Kitselman4 ° case thought some long term bonds
were securities and in the Burnham41 case that ten year prom-
issory notes also were securities. The Ninth Circuit in the
Lilienthal42 case held ten year collateral trust bonds to be
securities characterizing the Commissioner's argument to the
contrary as "unsupported by authority and obviously un-
sound." The Board of Tax Appeals in the Graham43 case
held that debentures having a six and one-half year term yet
36 Averill v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. (2d) 644- (1938).
37 Commissioner v. Tyng, 106 Fed. (2d) 55 (1939).
38 L. & C. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 Fed. (2d) 390 (1939).
39 Commissioner v. Freund, 98 Fed. (2d) 201 (1938).
40 Commissioner v. Kitselman, 89 Fed. (2d) 458 (1937).
41 Burnham v. Commissioner, 86 Fed. (2d) 776 (1936) cert. denied, 300
U. S. 683.
42 Lilienthal v. Commissioner, 80 Fed. (2d) 411 (1935).
43 Graham v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 623 (1938).
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to run which were assumed by the taxpayer were not securi-
ties but pointed out that the entire issue had been called and
paid off within less than a year of the assumption date; in
the Segall" case that a fifteen month promissory note was
not a security but that secured debenture notes, guaranteed,
maturing in installments at the end of one, two, three and
four years, respectively, were securities; in the Lloyd-Smith45
case that a two-year unsecured note was not a security.
On the question of term of the obligation, the above cases
do not easily lend themselves to classification or rationaliza-
tion. There is no case in which an obligation running six
years or more (and not called before maturity) is denied
classification as a security. On the other hand, the Tyng case
held that obligations maturing serially over a period of one
to five years were not securities, and the Segall case held that
obligations maturing over a period of one to four years were
securities. In the JXatts case the obligations matured serially,
the first series of $161,184.50 being for a term of 1/2 months
and the next series of $150,000 for a term of about 1 year
and the next series of $150,000 for a term of about 2 years.
Of the aggregate issue approximately 40% bore due dates
of about two years or less and the average maturity date for
the entire issue was 3 years and 3 months but the Supreme
Court stated definitely that all of these instruments were
''securities."
The Government may be in part responsible for the con-
fusion because rather than attempt to establish a particular
principle it has argued on both sides in order to protect the
revenue in particular cases. For example, in order to defeat
the establishment of a "reorganization," the Government has
argued in various cases that promissory notes are not "securi-
ties," that short term notes are not "securities," that unse-
cured obligations are not "securities"; and yet in the Burnham
case, in order to prove that there was a "reorganization,"
reversed its position and argued, successfully, that unsecured
promissory notes were "securities." When, in this case, the
44 Segall v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 43 (1938).
45 Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 214 (1939).
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taxpayer filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
alleging that there was conflict between the circuits, the
Government filed a brief in opposition to the petition stating
at page 6:
"The term 'securities' when used without qualification or restriction
as in the statute here involved includes promissory notes-both in
popular speech and in law."
In this brief the Government also went on to make its dis-
tinction of the Pinellas case as follows:
"That case does not hold, as contended by petitioner * * * that
promissory notes are not 'securities' within the provisions of the section
of the statute here in question. It merely holds that those notes were
purchase money notes and not 'securities' received in exchange for
property."
In the Lloyd-Smith case the Commissioner argued that a
$70,000 unsecured two-year note was not a security; in the
Huey & Philip Hardware case46 that a $70,000 unsecured
demand note was a security.
The foregoing discussion refers primarily to cases which,
in the text of the opinion, deal specifically with term. A large
number of the "reorganization" cases involve the question of
what constitutes a "security" but this particular point is often
submerged or lost in the general discussion of whether there
was a reorganization within the intent of the statute, the
intention to effect a reorganization or a sale, the continuity
of interest, whether the obligations were an important or
incidental part of the transaction and whether the considera-
tion accompanying the obligations in question was cash or
stock.
The problem of determining what is and what is not a
security remains and the Supreme Court in the LeTulle case
has made a contribution of only a negative character-i.e.,
of the factors to be considered, the term of the obligation is
immaterial.
46 40 B. T. A. 780.
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The Code itself gives no definition of a security applicable
to the above sections, although the word is defined several
times for limited and special purposes.4 7
Section 1800 of the Code levies a documentary stamp tax
on all
"bonds, debentures or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corpora-
tion, and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation
with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as cor-
porate securities."
In Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. lWelsh,48 referring to this
section, the court said:
"At the time of the enactment of this legislation the word 'securities'
was defined in Cyc as 'written assurances for the return or payment of
money; evidence of indebtedness.' 35 Cyc 1283."
This principle is equally applicable to the word "securities"
as used in the reorganization sections and would tend to
indicate a broad rather than a narrow construction of the
term.
47 In Section 23(g) where losses on worthless securities are subjected to the
limitations applicable to losses on the sale of capital assets, the word is defined
as follows:
"(3) Definition of securities.-As used in this subsection the
term 'securities' means (A) shares of stock in a corporation, and
(B) rights to subscribe for or to receive such shares."
In Section 23(k) dealing with the writing off of bad debts and securities, the
word is defined:
"(3) Definition of securitles.-As used in this subsection the
term 'securities' means bonds, debentures, notes, or certificates, or
other evidences, issued by any corporation (including those issued
by a government or political subdivision thereof), with interest
coupons or in registered form."
In Section 112(b) (5) it is provided that for the purpose of determining
whether the control is in the proportion required by the paragraph the amount
of any liabilities assumed by a transferor "shall be considered as stock or
securities received by such transferor." In Section 115(h), dealing with the
effect on earnings and profits of distributions of stock and securities, a sentence
provides:
"As used in this subsection the term 'stock or securities' includes
rights to acquire stock or securities."
48 (C. C. A. 9th) 38 F. (2d) 184. Mortgage participation certificates held to
be securities.
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There being no applicable definition in the Code, the courts
will be forced to turn to other sources. 49  Webster's New
International Dictionary defines the term "security" as
"An evidence of debt or of property as a bond, stock certificate, or other
iristrument, etc."
The Securities Act of 1933, as amended, provides, Section
2(1):
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness * * * or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' * * *"
Again, these definitions tend to indicate a broad rather than
a narrow construction of the term.
The LeTulle case has merely started the Board and the
courts off anew on the search for a definition and there are
few guides to date. Will not the ultimate answer be that
an obligation issued by a corporation is a "security" if it
represents a substantial interest and an investment position
in the issuing corporation; it is not a security if it represents
only a promise which is essentially equivalent to cash or a
delayed payment? This would follow in a general way the
philosophy of the "continuity of interest" rule which has
become a basis for decisions in reorganization cases. It
would also follow in a general way the reorganization cases
which emphasize the purpose and intent of the transaction.
Under such a rule the term of the obligations, whether
they were secured or unsecured, the size of the issue in rela-
tionship to the size of the corporation, the quick asset posi-
tion of the corporation in relationship to the issue, and the
purpose of the issue would all be factors which could be
considered by the court.
For example, a $100,000 two-year promissory note of the
United States Steel Corporation certainly would not be a.
security today under the cases. It would represent merely
a deferred payment of money or "the equivalent of cash."
49 Greenville Textile Supply Co., 1 B. T. A. 152.
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On the other hand, a $100,000 two-year promissory note of a
corporation with only $150,000 of non-liquid assets would
represent a substantial and important interest in that com-
pany. Such a note in a very real sense would constitute an
investment in the enterprise rather than "the equivalent of
cash" or a delayed payment.
It seems doubtful whether the courts can or will attempt
to differentiate corporate obligations on the basis of their
form-whether typewritten, on printed forms or engraved-
or whether they have serial numbers or printed indentures
behind them. While the courts tend to emphasize form in
stamp tax cases, in income tax cases the trend is clearly to
look at the substance of transactions, and ignore formalistic
matters.
If this paper can conclude with a prophecy, it would be
that the rule which will ultimately prevail as the test is this:
Corporate obligations, in negotiable form and available for
transfer, are securities if they give the holders a substantial
interest in the affairs of the obligor company. Going back
again to the Pinellas case, chief source of this general problem,
there is ample authority for such a rule. The court there said,
with reference to the utility company notes:
"Certainly, we think to be within the exemption, the seller must
acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing company more
definite than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase
money notes."
